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Abstract: 
The monetary policy trilemma maintains that financial openness, fixed 
exchange rates, and monetary independence cannot coexist. Yet, in the 1850s, 
Belgium violated this prediction. Through a study of nineteenth-century 
monetary policy implementation, this article investigates the reasons for such 
success. This was mainly built on the stabilisation of central bank liquidity, not 
of exchange rates as assumed by the target-zone literature. Other ingredients 
included: the role of circulating bullion as a buffer for central bank reserves, 
the banking system’s structural liquidity deficit towards the central bank, and 
the central bank’s size relative to the money market. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In patent violation with the prescriptions of the trilemma, the central bank1 of a small open 
economy was entrusted with an apparently inconsistent mandate: reconciling the defense of 
fixed exchange rates with monetary independence2. Yet the bank spectacularly succeeded in 
pursuing both targets, thus attracting the interest of international commentators. How was this 
paradoxical outcome made possible? How did the central bank manage to secure the 
credibility of the peg despite lack of realignment of the domestic interest rate to international 
levels? And what special conditions were necessary to the success? 
This article provides the first systematic analysis of a pioneering experiment in monetary 
policy endeavoured by the National Bank of Belgium (NBB, founded 1850) during the first 
decade of its life. It is organized as follows. Section 2 explains the motivations for this study 
and describes the issue. Section 3 analyses the NBB’s monetary policy and how it was 
implemented, thus providing a general framework for understanding the micro-foundations of 
19th-century central banking. Section 4 tests the findings empirically. Section 5 concludes. 
The main contribution of the article consists of showing that the creation of credibility 
through constructive ambiguity was a crucial ingredient of Belgian success. Yet other 
ingredients played a role: one was the use of circulating bullion as a buffer for central bank 
reserves; another one was central bank control over the market interest rate; and finally, there 
was the non-negligible size of the central bank’s balance sheet relative to the volume of the 
money market. All of them testify the existence of sophisticated policy-making in a largely 
unexplored monetary era. 
 
 
 
2. Motivation 
 
2.1: Monetary Independence under Fixed Exchange Rates 
 
To date, the so-called monetary policy trilemma remains one of the most popular and 
powerful references of textbook macroeconomic theory. In its simplest form, it consists of the 
prediction that a country cannot have financial openness, fixed exchange rates, and monetary 
policy independence at one time. Although empirical research has started to question the 
assumption that flexible exchange rates are a sufficient condition for monetary independence 
(Frankel et al. 2004), the trilemma is still generally seen as grounded by long-term historical 
evidence (Obstfeld et al. 2005). 
                                                          
1
 For simplicity, the term ‘central bank’ is used throughout the article. However, the reader should bear in mind 
that a 19th-century ‘central bank’ (or more properly said, a privately-owned chartered bank of issue) was 
something quite different from its nowadays’ counterpart – as section 3 makes clear. For a general discussion, 
see Goodhart (1988). 
2
 As in most of the literature, monetary independence is defined here as the divergence of domestic short-term 
nominal interest rates from international ones. For a discussion of this definition, see Obstfeld et al. (2005). 
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Fixed exchange rate regimes, however, happen to leave some room for monetary 
independence. This depends on the fact that in the real world, exchange rates have seldom 
been fixed at a precise parity; rather, they have generally been left free to fluctuate within a 
band around a central parity. According to Svensson (1994), this kind of monetary 
arrangement (called target zone) allows for a certain room of independence in the short term: 
if the peg is credible, expectations of realignment towards the par prevent the exchange rate 
from violating the margins of the band when domestic interest rates diverge from foreign 
ones. Due to its apparent status of a credible and well-behaved target-zone system, the 
international gold standard has been naturally seen as the ideal candidate for testing to what 
extent currency bands could deliver the much-wanted degree of monetary independence 
without impairing the long-term stability of exchange rate parities (Eichengreen and 
Flandreau 1997). For instance, Bordo and MacDonald (2005) have tested Svensson’s (1994) 
hypothesis on the three core currencies of the classical gold standard era (1880-1914) with 
positive results. Flandreau and Komlos (2006) have analysed the Austro-Hungarian 
experience during the two decades preceding the First World War, to conclude that the 
successful combination of foreign exchange stability and monetary independence rests on 
both credibility of the central parity and foreign exchange market efficiency. 
Yet the question of how credibility can be built – or differently said, of how independence is 
made possible in practice – still remains to be clarified. Once more, 19th-century monetary 
systems are an ideal ground for investigation. In a recent contribution, Jobst (2009a) argues 
convincingly that the situation observed by Flandreau and Komlos (2006) heavily depended 
on the action of the Austro-Hungarian Bank, which was ‘micro-managing’ foreign exchange 
markets through sophisticated techniques of intervention. As a result, the role of central banks 
in creating credibility emerges as a fundamental element of the picture. It must be 
acknowledged that the case of the Habsburg Empire is a rather special one, as – due to the 
long-lasting volatility of the national currency – Vienna was host to a liquid forward 
exchange market. This was not the case in most other financial centres, where forward 
exchange markets developed in the aftermath of the First World War3. But this does not mean 
that foreign exchange intervention techniques were unknown elsewhere: recent historical 
research has shown that the central banks of peripheral countries like Portugal (Reis 2007; 
Esteves et al. 2009), Norway (Øksendal 2008), or Sweden (Ögren 2007) were important 
players on the spot exchange market. Nowhere, however, the scale and scope of foreign 
exchange policy were comparable to those reached by the NBB in its early years. 
Although the NBB was not the first central bank to deal with foreign assets 4 , it was 
undoubtedly the first one to elaborate a consistent body of techniques that can be classified as 
foreign exchange policy. By the end of the 19th century, the Belgian primacy in this field had 
become commonplace between economists and practitioners (Conant 1910; Schiltz 2006)5. 
                                                          
3
 See e.g. Michie (2007) for the case of London. 
4
 For instance, Bordo et al. (2007) quote anecdotal evidence of operations in sterling claims by the Second Bank 
of the United States during the 1820s and 1830s. 
5
 See e.g. Palgrave (1903, p. 185): ‘Through holding these drafts on other countries the council of the Bank has 
the means of operating in any direction when the exchanges are unfavourable to Belgium. The moderate rates of 
discount charged and the comparatively small range of fluctuation show how carefully [...] the Bank of Belgium 
has maintained this power’. Later on (p. 219) the author seems to suggest that a similar policy should be adopted 
by the Bank of England (BoE) in order to reduce domestic interest rate volatility: ‘No precautions are taken in 
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The understanding of this pioneering experiment, however, has until now been constrained by 
lack of information. Except for some scanty statistics contained in its annual reports to 
shareholders, the NBB did not disclose any kind of datum concerning its operations. This 
explains why early commentators, such as Conant (1910), Van Elewyck (1913), or Witten 
(1918), were unable to enter into much detail on the question. As a result, the Belgian 
experience failed to translate into ‘best practice’ for potential imitators despite its 
international renown. The fact that even in archives nothing concerning the management of 
foreign reserves had apparently survived, moreover, discouraged a focused analysis by the 
official historians of the NBB, Kauch (1950) and Buyst et al. (2005). This article fills this gap 
by building on newly-collected databases constructed from previously unused files. 
 
 
Figure 1 about here 
 
 
2.2: The Belgian Puzzle of the 1850s 
 
Figure 1 shows something strange: since the opening of the NBB’s counters in January 1851, 
the Belgian franc turned from a high-yield to a low-yield currency. How was this possible? 
Some tentative explanations may come to mind. 
First, one might think that decoupling was the effect of the monetary arrangements in force at 
the time. In the mid-19th century, different regimes coexisted (gold standard, silver standard, 
bimetallic); despite the remarkable stability of the gold-silver ratio throughout the period 
(Flandreau 2004), expectations of future changes in this ratio might have created ‘peso 
problems’ in bilateral foreign exchange relationships. Ugolini (2010) investigates the 
phenomenon for five top international currencies during the period 1844-1870, and concludes 
that such problems existed up to a certain extent. The scale of risk premia, however, was 
smaller and more volatile than the one exhibited in the Belgian case. Moreover (and more 
importantly), places on the same metallic foot as Antwerp (like Amsterdam, Hamburg, and 
Frankfurt) displayed completely different patterns. Therefore, bullion prices do not provide an 
answer to the puzzle. It was the Belgian franc itself to enjoy a negative ‘peso problem’ with 
respect to all other currencies, which means that the phenomenon was fully country-specific. 
Second, the astonishing stability of the Antwerp market interest rate after the foundation of 
the NBB might look suspicious. The domestic market rate almost constantly coincided with 
the Bank’s discount rate, which acted as its upper bound (see table 1). It might be tempting to 
infer that the ‘true’ market rate was higher than the bank rate because of some form of credit 
rationing. Yet no quantitative or qualitative evidence of rationing does exist. As it was 
common practice among coeval central banks, the NBB stood ready to freely discount eligible 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
this country as at the Banks of Germany, Belgium, and elsewhere to mitigate the pressure of an unfavourable 
exchange by holding bills on other countries which can be “melted” when the need arises’. Not all comments 
were favourable, though. For instance, Juglar (1889, p. 173) argued that the Belgian experience ‘did not deliver 
the results that such an ingenious strategy seemed to promise, hence it has not been implemented elsewhere, and 
lack of imitators is enough to prove its uselessness’. The argument sounds rather surprising, especially in the 
light of the widespread international adoption of foreign exchange policies in the very same years Juglar was 
writing. 
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paper from agreed discounters: while the entry barrier to agreed counterparts may have played 
a role in reducing speculation ex-ante, it was something completely different from ex-post 
rationing6. As shown by extensive empirical evidence in section 4, lack of capital mobility 
can be definitely ruled out. 
Therefore, no ready explanation is available for the situation illustrated by figure 1. This 
article provides the micro-foundations of that macroeconomic puzzle, originated in the 
peculiar institutional arrangements that presided over the creation of Belgium’s central bank. 
 
 
Table 1 about here 
 
 
2.3: Institutional Background 
 
The NBB was founded in the aftermath of the 1848 convertibility crisis with a clear mandate 
for preserving the Belgian franc’s peg to silver: central bank money had to be fully 
convertible into silver species on demand, and a fractional bullion reserve had to be 
maintained (Statutes, article 13). However, the NBB also had another important (albeit 
informal) mandate for keeping the domestic interest rate low (Kauch 1950, pp. 58-59 and 99). 
This was intended to benefit both the economy and the Treasury itself, which had been 
issuing debt in national currency since 1844 (Depouhon 1873). Evidence of governmental 
pressure aimed at discouraging rate increases often emerges in the archives7, but the mandate 
looked like a ‘gentlemen’s agreement’ between the Board and the Treasury rather than a 
formal rule. As the Statutes did not mention the objective explicitly, the Bank was left free to 
set the policy it thought to be the most appropriate. In this context, foreign exchange policy 
quickly emerged as the most convenient solution for reconciling the two targets. 
The NBB had not been designed to perform foreign exchange policy: the Statutes of 1850 
never mention foreign reserves – neither to allow nor to forbid them. This vagueness was 
crucial in shaping the NBB’s action, based on a mix of transparency and opacity. The Bank 
was required to disclose its balance sheet monthly, but it was not compelled to provide details 
on foreign reserves (which were merged with domestic assets). While outsiders could be sure 
that the Bank respected legal requirements (viz. maintaining the minimum bullion coverage 
ratio), they knew nothing on the way this was made possible. Aimed at positively influence 
market expectations, this constructive ambiguity was key to the establishment of a credible 
peg. Section 3 explains how. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
6
 Kauch (1950, pp. 94-97 and 122-128) provides details on eligibility criteria applied by the NBB in the 1850s. 
Far from being restrictive, they look similar (if not laxer) to those implemented in France or Britain. These are 
discussed at length by Bignon et al. (2011) and Flandreau and Ugolini (2011). 
7
 Within the minutes of the Administration Board (PV CdA) see for instance: 8th and 11th October 1853; 24th 
December 1853; 9th and 21st January 1854; 29th November 1855; 29th October 1857; 5th and 14th November 
1857; 6th and 20th February 1858; 12th January 1860; 17th April 1860; etc. 
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3. The NBB in Context: Monetary Policy Implementation in the 19th Century 
 
3.1: The Central Bank’s Balance Sheet 
 
In order to understand how the NBB built the credibility of the peg, it is convenient to provide 
an overview of what monetary policy was and how it was implemented in the 19th century. 
This implies, as a first step, a thorough analysis of the micro-foundations of central banking – 
viz. the structure of the central bank’s balance sheet, the instruments at its disposal, and the 
targets of monetary policy8. Albeit focused on the Belgian case, the overview offers a number 
of comparative insights that may be of value for a general reassessment of monetary policy 
implementation in the 19th century. 
Table 2 provides a list of the components of the NBB’s balance sheet, as well as some 
statistics about their relative size during the first three years of life of the Bank. On the asset 
side of the published balance sheet, one finds (besides a few minor items) four major 
components: 1) the bullion reserve, made up of silver and gold species and bars9; 2) Belgian 
Treasury securities; 3) advances on national sovereign bonds 10 ; and 4) the portfolio of 
commercial bills, including foreign reserves (viz. bills payable abroad). As the composition of 
this portfolio was undisclosed, data shown in Table 2 had to be computed from archival 
sources (see paragraph 4.1). 
On the liability side of the balance sheet, one finds three major items: i) capital and reserves; 
ii) banknotes in circulation; and iii) deposits. While the bulk of liabilities consists of 
banknotes, the size of deposits is considerable. Given the fact that deposits were not 
remunerated, this is a rather surprising feature for a country that lacked both a centralized 
clearing house for interbank payments and (either formal or informal) reserve requirements11. 
Although the NBB never provided details on the composition of this item, some coeval 
observers argued that more than 85% of it consisted of Treasury deposits (Brasseur 1864). 
Unfortunately, no official data are available to confirm or dismiss such allegations – which 
nonetheless seem to be plausible (Van Elewyck 1913). If this were actually the case, 
Government balances may be seen as a sort of permanent (and unremunerated) investment in 
the (privately-owned) central bank. The role of this informal ‘subsidy’ in providing the NBB 
with additional resources was far from negligible. 
 
Table 2 about here 
 
 
                                                          
8
 The literature on the micro-foundations of monetary policy implementation has developed recently. This 
section draws inspiration mainly from Bindseil (2004), Disyatat (2008), and Jobst (2009b). 
9
 While required of keeping central bank money fully convertible into silver species, the NBB was left free to 
determine the composition of bullion reserves. 
10
 Unlike most other central banks of the time, the NBB was forbidden both to purchase on its own account and 
to accept as collateral for advances any kind of stocks and bonds, except those issued by the Treasury. This norm 
was formally intended to avoid the risk of excessive immobilization (Kauch 1950), but the idea that the Bank 
had to focus on enhancing the liquidity of government securities certainly played a role (Depouhon 1873). 
11
 For instance, the fact that in the second half of the 19th century deposits at the BoE grew more and more 
sizeable was due both to the institution of an interbank clearing house settling in BoE balances (1854) and to the 
establishment of informal reserve requirements after the Baring crisis (Sayers 1936). 
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3.2: The Central Bank’s Instruments 
 
As it was typically the case for 19th-century central banks (and in stark contrast with 
nowadays’ practice), most of the NBB’s activities passed through the Bank’s standing 
facilities – or differently said, they mostly consisted of operations accomplished on demand of 
the public. The Bank stood ready to provide unlimited access to these facilities at its counters 
located throughout the country. Two types of operations were supplied without restriction: a) 
repurchase agreements on Belgian sovereign bonds, and b) discounts (i.e. open-window 
purchases) of short-term Belgian-franc-denominated bills12. Besides these regular facilities, 
other extraordinary ones could be offered to the public in special circumstances: discounts of 
short-term foreign bills and foreign exchange repurchase agreements. Being optional 
operations which could be discontinued by the Bank at any time, they will be treated 
separately (see paragraphs 3.5 and 3.6 respectively). 
Like today, in the 19th century the interest rate at which the central bank stood ready to 
provide liquidity through its discount facility worked as an upper bound for domestic 
interbank rates. Yet unlike today, there was no other rate the central bank considered as 
desirable but the one charged at its standing facility13. As a result, the differential between 
market and bank rate reveals the ability of the central bank to influence the short-term rate. By 
construction, such an ability closely depends on the structural liquidity deficit of the banking 
system with respect to the central bank – i.e. the need for domestic agents to resort to central 
bank credit in order to accomplish their ordinary operations (Bindseil 2004). Hence, the 
differential between market and bank rate can be seen as a raw indicator of the degree of 
dependence of the domestic financial sector from central bank lending: the smaller the 
differential, the larger the structural liquidity deficit14. As seen, table 1 points to a strong 
ability by the NBB to influence the domestic rate15. 
Besides providing liquidity to the public on demand, the NBB was also implementing open 
market operations (OMOs) – or differently said, transactions accomplished on initiative of the 
institution itself. They consisted of outright purchases or sales of those securities the Bank 
was allowed to be invested in. According to widespread 19th-century practice, the central bank 
was not used to buying or reselling domestic bills in the open market16. As a result, the only 
instruments the NBB could use for its OMOs were a) Belgian sovereign bonds and b) foreign 
bills. The scale and scope of these operations are discussed in paragraph 3.4. 
 
                                                          
12
 The Bank discounted freely three-name bills payable in Belgium with a maturity not exceeding 90 days. Two-
name bills were also discounted, albeit at a higher rate. 
13
 The desired level of the domestic interbank rate was functional to the defence of convertibility (see paragraph 
3.3). The first central bank to distinguish between the rate offered for unlimited credit at the standing facility and 
the desired interbank rate was the BoE, which in 1877 began to discount at a lower rate than the official one 
(Sayers 1936). A similar approach had been adopted in 1825-1844 (Wood 1939). 
14
 Properly speaking, the structural liquidity deficit should be measured as the difference between liquidity-
injecting and liquidity-absorbing monetary policy operations by the central bank. Yet it is impossible to apply 
this definition correctly to the case of 19th-century central banks because of the difficulty of separating monetary 
policy operations from autonomous factors (esp. in the case of banknote circulation). 
15
 This was not the case, for instance, in Britain, where the money market ‘outside the Bank’ was large and the 
BoE’s ability to influence the interbank rate was limited. The inconvenience of this situation prompted 
Threadneedle Street to find devices in order to ‘make the Bank rate effective’ (Sayers 1936). 
16
 This seems to have been a general rule everywhere, including Britain (Sayers 1936). 
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3.3: The Targets of Monetary Policy 
 
Central banks have both final and operational targets. Nowadays, most central banks have 
price stability as their final target, and some other variable (typically, a short-term interest 
rate) as their operational one17. Markets are generally aware of the importance of operational 
targets and look at them in order to assess the central banks’ ability to achieve their long-term 
objectives. In the 19th century, most central banks had the defence of convertibility as their 
main final target. Contrary to the assumptions of the target-zone literature, the operational 
target through which this was pursued did not consist of the maintenance of exchange rates 
within the bullion points (i.e. avoiding bullion drains from the country), but of the 
preservation of a ‘margin of manoeuvre’ available for performing countercyclical action 
without breaking convertibility rules 18 . Such a margin can be called excess reserves, or 
central bank liquidity (). 
What was the level of central bank liquidity to target? As a matter of fact, a trade-off existed: 
as well as too low a level endangered convertibility, too high a level impaired the central 
bank’s profitability. Both risks put a question mark on the long-term sustainability of current 
monetary arrangements, and thus on the credibility of the peg. As a result, central banks had 
to find the right equilibrium level for this operational target. 
Central bank liquidity was defined differently across countries. Two systems prevailed: 
1) In the differential system19 , the central bank was allowed to issue freely a fixed 
amount of banknotes, while any extra banknote put into circulation had to be met by a 
100% bullion backing. In this case, the operational target   consisted of what 
Bagehot (1873) called the cash reserve – i.e., the amount of banknotes that could still 
be put into circulation without breaking statutory rules: 
 =  +	 −  
where  is the fixed amount of banknotes the bank is allowed to issue without bullion 
backing, 	 is the bullion reserve, and  is the amount of banknotes already issued20. 
                                                          
17
 ‘An operational target is an economic variable that the central bank wants to control and indeed can control to 
a very large extent on a daily basis through the use of its monetary policy instruments. […] The final target of 
monetary policy is the economic variable that the central bank eventually aims at. Thus, operational […] targets 
are nothing more than means towards reaching the final target without a specific value of their own.’ (Bindseil 
2004, pp. 7-9). 
18
 ‘Countercyclical action’ means here the central bank’s provision of liquidity to the domestic banking system 
during a crisis, when a scramble for cash takes place in the interbank market. In contrast with today, in the 19th 
century central banks’ ability to meet the banking system’s demand for high-powered money was limited by 
convertibility rules; as a result, the size of the above-mentioned ‘margin of manoeuvre’ signalled to the public 
how remote the possibility of a disruption of liquidity provision was. Anecdotal evidence suggests this margin 
played a pivotal role in driving expectations: during the crises of 1847, 1857, and 1866, for instance, panic in the 
London money market receded on the announcement that Peel’s Act would be temporarily suspended – which 
meant that the BoE’s margin of manoeuvre would temporarily become unlimited (Bagehot 1873). 
19
 This system was adopted in Britain in 1844. Other countries (e.g. Norway) had similar arrangements. 
20
 This interpretation of the BoE’s reaction function builds on the accounts of contemporary observers. A drop in 
the cash reserve amounted to what Dornbusch and Frenkel (1984) call ‘an internal drain’. As central bank 
liquidity was a synthetic indicator of the overall position of the Bank, this interpretation is not necessarily 
inconsistent with the results of Jeanne (1995) or Davutyan and Parke (1995). 
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2) In the proportional system21, the central bank was only allowed to issue banknotes 
against a given fraction  of bullion kept in reserve. Typically (as in the Belgian case), 
compulsory bullion backing applied not only to the banknote circulation, but also to 
all other sight liabilities. In this system, the operational target  consisted of the 
cash surplus – i.e., the amount of bullion that was not backing the monetary base: 
 = 	 −  +  
where  is the amount of deposits with the bank. 
In both the differential and proportional systems, central bank liquidity had a full 
informational value as an indicator of the monetary authority’s funds available for acting 
counter-cyclically. This item was closely watched by the public in order to understand how 
much the bank could react to shocks without impairing convertibility – or differently said, 
how credible the peg was. As a result, stabilising the level of central bank liquidity was 
supposed to enhance the credibility of the peg in the long term, thus producing stabilising 
expectations (and mean-reverting speculation) in the foreign exchange market. 
 
 
3.4: Choice of the Instrument 
 
The stabilisation of central bank liquidity was pursued by 19th-century monetary authorities 
through different strategies, according to the different institutional framework in which they 
operated. For instance, taking advantage of the sensitivity of international gold flows to the 
London interbank rate, the BoE heavily relied on interest rate policy in order to push bullion 
back and forth from its vaults (Sayers 1936). Yet such a strategy implied an extreme interest 
rate volatility that came to be criticized by coeval observers (Palgrave 1903). Moreover, the 
action of peripheral central banks could not possibly have the same impact as the Bank of 
England’s on international bullion markets. As a result, the techniques that could be adopted 
in places like Belgium needed to be very different from those implemented in core countries. 
As pointed out in paragraph 3.2, the instruments at the NBB’s disposal included both standing 
facilities and OMOs. In order to achieve its operational target, the Bank had then two options: 
either changing the conditions for access to discounts and advances, or intervening directly on 
its own initiative. Despite being completely free to move the bank rate, there were at least two 
reasons that deterred it from doing this too frequently: the informal mandate to maintain a low 
domestic rate discouraged any increase, while profitability concerns discouraged any 
decrease. Hence, the Bank was generally inclined to act as much as possible through OMOs, 
which could concern (as seen) two different kinds of securities: Belgian sovereign bonds and 
foreign bills. In the 1850s, however, national Treasury bonds were still fairly illiquid 
securities, and the Bank abstained from producing volatility into this market22. Moreover, 
looking at the published balance sheet, the public was able to appreciate variations in the 
amount of Government bonds held – and thus to assess the extent of the Bank’s action. By 
                                                          
21
 This system was adopted by most Continental countries, including France and Belgium. 
22
 The amount of sovereign bonds held by the NBB remained fairly stable over time. For instance, in the period 
from February 1851 to December 1853 only two major changes took place: an increase from BEF7m to 
BEF14m in February 1852 (when the Bank underwrote a new 5% loan), and a decrease to BEF9m in August 
1853 (RAG, 1851-1853). 
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contrast, as the NBB was not required to disclose the composition of its commercial portfolio, 
operations in foreign bills could be easily hidden to the general public – as no outsider ever 
knew the size of the Bank’s foreign reserves. Both the liquidity of foreign exchange markets 
and the degree of secrecy allowed for transactions in these assets made them emerge as the 
ideal tool for achieving the operational target. 
 
 
 
3.5: Achieving the Operational Target in Ordinary Conditions 
 
Foreign reserves seemed a particularly apt instrument for monetary policy implementation for 
an additional reason as well: the NBB was able to adapt with a considerable degree of 
precision their size to the level needed in order to counterbalance variations in central bank 
liquidity. This was not the case for any of the other components of the asset side of its balance 
sheet. As said, the Bank was expected to be invested in a certain sum of national Treasury 
securities, whose dismissal (or accumulation) by the institution would have engendered 
turbulence in an illiquid market. Being the recipient of the Bank’s standing facilities, the 
amount of both advances and discounted domestic bills was demand-driven. The same was 
the case for the bullion reserve, whose repartition between ‘compulsory’ reserve and cash 
surplus depended on the size of sight liabilities – deposits and banknotes in circulation, in turn 
two demand-driven items. 
Diagrams 1.1-2 help highlight how playing with foreign reserves proved a convenient policy 
instrument for the stabilisation of central bank liquidity. The illustration is based on a 
simplified version of the balance sheet, including: on the asset side, the bullion reserve (	), 
the domestic portfolio , and the foreign portfolio ; on the liability side, banknotes in 
circulation () and deposits (). The bullion reserve can be split into two different items, viz. 
the cash surplus  and the ‘compulsory’ reserve 	, defined as 
	 =  +  
where  = 1 3⁄ . 
OMOs on foreign bills aimed at stabilising the cash surplus (or differently said, conversions 
of  into  and vice-versa) could be sterilised or not. On the one hand, a sterilised operation 
consisted of a direct conversion of bullion into foreign bills (and vice-versa), leaving the 
liability side of the Bank’s balance sheet unchanged – and thus, having no impact on domestic 
agents (see diagram 1.1). On the other hand, a non-sterilised operation consisted of 
exchanging foreign bills against high-powered money (and vice-versa)23, implying changes 
on both sides of the Bank’s balance sheet – and thus, entailing modifications in the liquidity 
of the domestic banking system (see diagram 1.2)24. A trade-off existed between these two 
techniques for controlling  by acting on . Sterilised operations were more expensive than 
                                                          
23
 For simplicity, diagram 1.2 assumes that non-sterilised operations only impacted banknote circulation. This is 
reasonable in view of the finding that deposits mostly consisted of Government’s and not of bankers’ balances. 
24
 The NBB often combined OMOs with the introduction of new standing facilities: when purchasing foreign 
bills on its own initiative, the Bank started discounting the same assets on demand (Ugolini 2011). This being an 
optional facility, the Bank could discontinue it at any time: as a result, it was not fundamentally dissimilar to 
non-sterilised OMOs. 
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non-sterilised ones: while buying or selling foreign bills against banknotes virtually entailed 
no transaction costs, purchasing or dismissing bullion abroad always implied a number of 
non-negligible fees25. However, as diagram 1.2 shows, non-sterilised operations were a rather 
inefficient technique for converting   into   (and vice-versa): only one-third of the total 
change in the foreign portfolio (and in circulation) translated into a change in the cash surplus, 
and beyond a given level, their impact on the monetary base could be big enough to entail 
destabilising effects on the domestic money market. As a consequence, fine-tuning of central 
bank liquidity required the Bank to implement non-sterilised operations close to the targeted 
level of  (where the required adjustment was small) and sterilised operations far from that 
level (where the required adjustment was big). 
Thanks to daily OMOs on foreign bills, the NBB was able to achieve the operational target 
without having to modify access conditions to its standing facilities. This allowed for the 
stabilisation of bank rates in ordinary times. In case of shocks, however, such a strategy might 
not have been enough to counteract a reduction in , and the Bank could be forced to resort to 
other instruments in order to resume a convenient level of central bank liquidity. 
 
Diagrams 1.1 and 1.2 about here 
 
 
3.6: Achieving the Operational Target in Extraordinary Conditions 
 
Inasmuch as the stabilisation of central bank liquidity could enhance the credibility of the peg, 
there always existed a given level of interest rate differentials at which exchange rates would 
move beyond the bullion points anyway. In such an event, the structure of the domestic 
bullion market played a role in determining the behaviour of monetary authorities. If the 
country had a large stock of circulating bullion to meet the demand for export, the outflow 
would not necessarily translate into a run on central bank reserves. Conversely, intervention 
would be needed if the drain directly impacted the central bank. In the latter case, reactions 
differed according to specific institutional frameworks. While the BoE used to react by 
aggressively increasing the discount rate, the NBB was prompted by its informal mandate to 
try some alternative strategies in the first place. 
On 20th October 1855, the Governor told the Administration Board: 
‘If [1] the domestic portfolio were to grow and [2] the foreign portfolio were to halve with 
respect to its current level, then there would be room for [3] raising the interest rate on 
repurchase agreements before changing [4] the discount rate and [5] eligibility criteria 
for domestic bills’. 
This is perhaps the best synthetic enunciation of the NBB’s strategy in the event of monetary 
disturbances. First of all, the Bank would continue to lend freely to domestic agents in order 
to meet increasing demand. Secondly, it would start selling foreign assets in order to counter 
the decrease of the cash surplus without reducing loans to the domestic system. Thirdly, it 
would raise the interest rate on foreign exchange repos in order to shrink profitability margins 
for bullion exporters. Fourthly, in case all the previous steps had not been enough, it would 
                                                          
25
 These are the same fees allowing for the existence of bullion points (freight, insurance, loss of interest). 
12 
 
resort to raising the discount rate. If and only if this latter measure had not worked (which 
never happened to be the case, except at the outbreak of war in July 1870), then the Bank 
would change eligibility criteria for domestic bills – which amounted to de facto credit 
rationing. 
The alternative strategies put in place by the NBB consisted of steps 2 and 3. Step 2 had a 
two-edged aspect. From the point of view of the Bank, OMOs on foreign bills could be useful 
not only to refurbish reserves. If performed on a focused bilateral foreign exchange market 
and on a sufficiently large scale, they could also have an impact on exchange rates – or 
differently said, they could become foreign exchange (plain vanilla) interventions. The 
rationale was straightforward: by selling foreign bills on the domestic market, the NBB could 
try to pull the exchange rate within the bullion points, thus annihilating the net profitability of 
arbitrage. This strategy could prove successful in the very short term. As the Bank refused to 
borrow reserves abroad, however, it found a natural limit in the depletion of the portfolio of 
that specific currency26. 
Step 3 concerned a different level of intervention. In August 1851 the Bank had opened a new 
standing facility, named achats et ventes d’effets sur l’étranger: the Bank bought spot foreign 
bills and resold them forward at the same price plus a fixed interest rate. This is the first 
documented case of a central bank using this kind of instruments. The facility was supposed 
to be an ideal tool for exporters: as the interest rate applied by the NBB was homogeneous on 
all kinds of foreign bills, the repo rate often happened to be lower than the interest rate 
applicable on that currency – which made the choice of borrowing on the security of bills 
more convenient than discounting them on the market. As a consequence, repos began to be 
widely used by a particular class of exporters, i.e. bullion arbitrageurs. The Bank typically 
raised the repo rate before all other rates in order to counter silver shipments27. The move was 
supposed to have the same effect as plain vanilla interventions, i.e. shrinking profitability 
margins for bullion exporters. As this facility was fully optional to the Bank, it could be 
discontinued in case of need: this had the potential to impact exchange rates in the short term 
by forcing potential borrowers to liquidate their foreign claims on the market. 
Steps 2 and 3 were aimed at delaying, not at replacing the eventual increase of the domestic 
discount rate28. Nonetheless, this lag allowed the NBB to resist during the initial phases of an 
international disturbance, and to start raising its discount rate much later than all other central 
banks. At the peak of the crisis, there still were margins for the full effect of a restrictive 
policy to be felt by domestic agents. The effectiveness of interest rate policy was tied to the 
net liquidity deficit of the domestic banking system with respect to the central bank, and such 
a deficit was apparently quite large (see paragraph 3.2). As a result, external pressure tended 
to recede before the effects of delayed restrictive policy faded – i.e. before the NBB was 
obliged to realign the domestic rate to international levels. Skilfully playing this waiting 
game, the Bank became able to provide the country with that degree of monetary 
independence contemporaries came to admire. 
                                                          
26
 Borrowing reserves was a technique other central banks did not refuse to adopt, but came at a remarkable cost 
– as shown by the experience of the Bank of Portugal (Reis 2007). 
27
 PV CdA, 7th and 23th December 1854; 20th October 1855; 17th and 29th January 1856; 17th June 1856; 2nd April 
1859. As time passed and the turnover of repurchase operations grew, the NBB tried to restrict access to this 
facility to Belgian agents only, refusing to accept bills directly remitted by foreign bankers. 
28
 PV CdA, 19th October 1854. 
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4. The NBB at Work: Empirical Evidence 
 
4.1: Data 
 
In spite of the absence of the ledgers covering foreign exchange operations, it is nonetheless 
possible to reconstruct the NBB’s action by using other archival material. The minutes of the 
Administration Board report every purchase and sell order the Bank decided to execute. 
Although the source is often elusive about amounts, the duration of operations is always 
given. As a result, one can construct a quantitative series of foreign exchange operations 
based on the total purchasing and selling times29. 
Albeit limited to the sub-period 1851-1853, the actual amounts of foreign exchange 
operations are provided by the Governor’s correspondence. As the overwhelming majority of 
domestic operations on foreign bills were implemented in Antwerp and not in Brussels, it is 
possible to track transactions one-by-one on the letters exchanged with the Bank’s branch. 
This allows for the creation of a high-frequency database30. 
In the remainder of this section, data on actual amounts transacted (1851-1853) are employed 
to study those aspects of the NBB’s policy whose analysis requires precise, high-frequency 
data (OMOs and foreign portfolio management), while data on the length of operations (1851-
1861) are used to document the Bank’s reaction to the shocks taking place during the decade. 
 
Figures 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, and 2.4 about here 
 
 
4.2: The Operational Target: Exchange Rates vs. Central Bank Liquidity 
 
Paragraph 3.3 argued that the operational target through which the NBB pursued the final 
target of maintaining convertibility was not the stabilisation of exchange rates within the 
bullion points, but the stabilisation of its own cash surplus. The proposition is tested here by 
looking into detail at the Bank’s operations during the period 1851-185331. 
For the four main currencies the Bank was dealing in32, figures 2.1-4 show the distribution of 
weekly foreign exchange operations33 vis-à-vis the deviation of the exchange rate34 from the 
                                                          
29
. The duration of intervention has been taken as a proxy for size even by some contemporary scholars 
(Dominguez and Frankel 1993, p. 73). When data on length and amount of operations are both available in our 
sample (as for 1851-1853), the fit is always good. 
30
 Based on the Governor’s correspondence (IC 1851-1853), the database has been cross-checked to match the 
data occasionally provided by other sources (PV CdA 1851-1853; RAG 1851-1853). 
31
 This period can be qualified as a time span in which ‘ordinary conditions’ prevailed, with the exception of 
November-December 1853 when the Crimean War erupted. 
32
 In the period 1851-1853, the NBB implemented open market operations in six different currencies (French 
franc, British pound, Dutch guilder, Hamburg mark banco, Frankfurt guilder, Prussian thaler). Operations in bills 
on Frankfurt and Berlin, however, only had a limited scale because of the illiquidity of the bilateral exchange 
markets (bills on Belgium were not even quoted in the two German centres). 
33
 Purchases of foreign bills have a positive sign, while sales of foreign bills have a negative sign. 
34
 The exchange rate is defined here as the price of a unit of foreign currency expressed in terms of the domestic 
unit. 
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arbitrated par at the beginning of the week. The arbitrated par represents the central value to 
which the Belgian franc is pegged and with respect to which the bullion points (i.e. the limits 
of the ‘no-arbitrage zone’) are computed35. If foreign exchange operations were aimed at 
stabilizing exchange rates (leaning-against-the-wind interventions), one would expect them to 
have a strict NW-SE configuration (purchases of foreign currency when its price is low, sales 
when it is high). Yet this is not the case: considerable transactions were implemented when 
the exchange rate was closed to the par or even beyond it (leaning-with-the-wind 
interventions). Impacting exchange rates may have been one of the determinants of open 
market operations, but it clearly was not the first one. 
This is confirmed by the Bank’s portfolio management strategy. In case foreign reserves had 
been cumulated with the aim of defending the value of the Belgian franc, one would expect 
the NBB to hold a considerable ‘armoury’ especially denominated in core currencies. Yet 
figure 3 shows that the amount of reserves in the most important international currency of the 
time (the British pound) varied considerably in the years under scrutiny, up to the point of 
disappearing completely for a long sub-period (June to December 1852). While dismissing 
sterling, the NBB diversified its foreign portfolio considerably by starting to buy minor 
currencies it had never held before. This suggests that other reasons than creating an ‘arsenal’ 
for intervention guided the Bank’s portfolio management 36 . The obvious candidate is 
profitability. Returns on foreign bills depended on two components: a) the current yield of the 
given asset (i.e. the market interest rate) and b) future variations of the exchange rate. While 
the first component was certain for the Bank, the second one was not. However, a credible 
fixed-exchange-rate regime implies that expectations concerning the future path of exchange 
rates must be mean-reverting; although the time horizon for the realignment to take place is 
uncertain, the direction of the movement must be certain. For the main ‘reshufflings’ of the 
foreign portfolio implemented by the Bank, table 3 provides data on both the average 
‘opportunity cost’ of holding the asset until its quarterly maturity (column A) and the average 
degree of overvaluation of the currency in which the asset was denominated (column B: see 
table for details). Although investment choices were mainly dictated by expected exchange 
rate realignments, interest rates also played a role (as e.g. in the case of the Prussian thaler). 
On the whole, expected returns emerge as the driver of the Bank’s foreign portfolio 
allocation. 
Therefore, exchange rates were the main determinant of the composition of , but not of its 
size. As a matter of fact, portfolio diversification could be enacted without necessarily 
impacting the Bank’s balance sheet37 . OMOs determining the volume of reserves had a 
different driver: the level of central bank liquidity. Figure 4 shows the distribution of monthly 
                                                          
35
 The computation of arbitrated pars is discussed by Ugolini (2010). As prices of ingots were not quoted in 
Belgium, the price of silver was replaced by the metallic content of legal-tender full-bodied species. This is 
reasonable, as bullion arbitrage from Belgium always took the form of shipments of silver 5-franc species. 
36
 This is not completely the case for the second core currency of the time, the French franc, whose holdings by 
the Bank never fell beneath a certain level. As shown by figures 2.1-4, the French franc was basically the only 
one on which the NBB enacted sterilised OMOs; this was due to the de facto currency union between France and 
Belgium (Parker Willis 1901), which allowed the Bank to buy silver 5-franc species in Paris and immediately 
use them to pay for its own banknotes in Brussels. As a result, the minimum level of French francs can be 
considered as the only foreign reserve strictu sensu held by the NBB. 
37
 Reshufflings in the composition of the foreign portfolio could be implemented abroad by directly swapping 
one foreign currency against the other. 
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foreign exchange operations vis-à-vis the level of 	 at the beginning of the month. In spite of 
some noise (tied to the length of the time unit)38, it is possible to observe that foreign reserves 
decreased when  was small and increased when  was large. Also the choice of the type of 
transaction depended on : non-sterilised operations (whose impact on the monetary base was 
huge) were mostly performed when the required adjustment of  was small, while sterilised 
operations (whose impact on the monetary base was limited) were mostly performed when the 
required adjustment of  was large. Finally, the chart suggests that the level of central bank 
liquidity targeted by the Bank during these years was around BEF7.5m – something like 7% 
of the average size of the balance sheet and 18% of the average size of bullion reserves. 
 
Table 3 and figures 3 and 4 about here 
 
 
4.3: The Operational Target: Reaction to Shocks 
 
Paragraph 3.6 argued that OMOs were implemented with the aim of impacting exchange rates 
(or differently said, that they became foreign exchange interventions properly speaking) in 
extraordinary conditions only – viz., in the event of a bullion drain affecting central bank 
reserves. The proposition is tested here by looking at the NBB’s action on the franc/sterling 
bilateral exchange market in 1851-1861, when the Bank performed at least six interventions 
explicitly aimed at lowering the price of claims on London39. 
Figure 5 juxtaposes the gross profitability of exporting silver species from Belgium to Britain 
with quantitative and qualitative evidence of silver shipments40: it suggests that exports of 
bullion took place when the gross profitability of the transaction exceeded around 0.5%, 
where the bullion export point must have been located. The striking thing is that the exchange 
rate on London was often above this threshold during the decade – almost constantly from 
June 1855 to December 1857, and again from October 1858 to June 1860. Yet, as shown by 
figure 6, intervention on sterling was not implemented by the NBB throughout these periods 
of exceptional weakness of the franc. As a matter of fact, the six special operations were only 
performed when the Bank’s cash surplus was collapsing – i.e. when the silver exported by 
arbitrageurs directly came from the NBB’s vaults. When silver in circulation provided enough 
supply to exporters, instead, the central bank did not feel compelled to intervene and let the 
exchange rate fluctuate freely beyond the bullion point. 
 
Figures 5 and 6 about here 
 
 
                                                          
38
 While data on OMOs are available on a daily basis, data on balance sheet components are only available on a 
monthly basis. Unfortunately, this does not allow to catch the effects of abrupt variations in  during the month. 
39
 The term ‘explicitly’ here means that the minutes of the Administration Board (which were undisclosed to the 
public) clearly report the Directors’ intention to impact exchange rates; it does not mean that such an objective 
was publicly announced. 
40
 Quantitative evidence consists of amounts of silver species shipped by the Brussels agent of NM Rothschild & 
Sons to the London house. Qualitative evidence consists of written witnesses of silver shipments to Britain by 
Belgian arbitrageurs: these are taken from two different sources (the Rothschild correspondence and PV CdA). 
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4.4: Pursuing Monetary Independence: A Case Study 
 
Paragraph 3.6 argued that foreign exchange intervention was part of a strategy aimed at 
delaying increases of the discount rate. This is illustrated here by an analysis of the Bank’s 
reaction to the most violent shock of the decade – the 1857 crisis. 
Figure 7 shows that in the early spring of 1857, improving central bank liquidity suggested 
the NBB to drop its rate in spite of the weakness of the Belgian franc with respect to the 
British pound. Unfortunately, this coincided with tighter money on the London market: silver 
shipments to Britain intensified, and the Bank’s bullion reserve shrank due to withdrawals by 
exporters. This prompted the Bank to implement direct intervention on the foreign exchange 
market. Since mid-April, conspicuous sales of sterling were enacted in Antwerp. These plain 
vanilla interventions only had limited (and short-lived) effects in pushing the exchange rate 
down to the arbitrated par – they met some success in July, which quickly abated as soon as 
the Bank’s sales stopped. Moreover, the fall of sterling was also tied to a temporary ease in 
the London market rate, which decreased more than 1% in the same weeks. Nonetheless, sales 
proved effective in stopping the fall of . 
In mid-July, however, bullion reserves sunk dramatically; by the end of the month, they fell 
slightly below the statutory coverage ratio of one-third of the Bank’s sight liabilities41. In 
view of the depletion of the sterling portfolio, the NBB rapidly raised its repo rate to the 
maximum level allowed by the Code de Commerce (an usury ceiling was still fixed at 6%)42. 
This brought the NBB repo rate to a higher level than the London market rate, thus 
annihilating the convenience of using this facility for exporting silver to Britain. 
A period of ease followed. In late August and September the profitability margins of shipping 
silver shrank, and the Bank’s cash surplus was restored. In the early days of October, 
however, Britain was hit by panic, and the London interbank rate skyrocketed. As soon as it 
went above 6%, the NBB decided to suspend repurchase facilities altogether. At this point 
only, in front of a sharp drop in bullion reserves, the discount rate on domestic bills was 
raised twice. Yet at the very peak of the crisis, when the London rate touched 10%, this 2% 
increase to 5.5% was enough for reversing the trend: by the end of November,  was growing 
steadily. In the space of a few weeks the crisis was over, without the Bank having to raise its 
discount rate to the foreign levels. 
The NBB’s reaction to the 1857 crisis shows how monetary independence was pursued in 
practice: thanks to a skilful combination of devices, the Bank was able to delay a realignment 
of the domestic interest rate to the international level. While ineffective in the long term, such 
a policy worked very smoothly in the short term. As liquidity crises tended to be rather short-
                                                          
41
 The Statutes of the NBB gave the Finance Minister the power of allowing the minimum coverage ratio to pass 
temporarily from one-third to one-fourth of sight liabilities. The Minister preferred the Bank to let the cash 
surplus turn negative rather than to raise the discount rate abruptly, and gave his consent. This was also the case 
at the peak of the crisis: PV CdA, 14th November 1857. 
42
 During the 1857 crisis, usury ceilings were abolished in many European countries (including France). At the 
peak of the storm, the NBB consulted the Government on the prospect of taking the same step in Belgium as 
well; the Finance Minister showed a positive attitude and prepared a bill to be proposed to the Parliament, but 
the worst was over before the move became necessary. The usury ceiling was definitively repealed a few years 
later (Kauch 1950, pp. 121-122).  
17 
 
lived, however, the technique proved well-suited to the needs of a 19th-century small open 
economy. 
 
Figure 7 about here 
 
 
5. Summary and Conclusions 
 
This article has provided the first detailed analysis of a pioneering 19th-century monetary 
experiment which allowed for the maintenance of financial openness, a fixed exchange 
regime, and a remarkable degree of monetary independence at the same time. The success of 
this experiment depended on a number of special ingredients. They may be summarized as 
follows. 
First and foremost, as predicted by the literature on target zones, the establishment of the 
credibility of the peg was the basic ingredient of the recipe. But contrary to the assumptions 
of this literature, credibility was not built through the stabilisation of exchange rates, but 
through the stabilisation of central bank liquidity (i.e. the funds available for countercyclical 
action before letting the peg go). The strategy rested on a skilful combination of transparency 
(the Bank published data on its own liquidity) and opacity (nothing was known about the way 
stabilisation was obtained through the use of foreign exchange reserves). This constructive 
ambiguity proved effective in enhancing the credibility of the Belgian currency. 
The second ingredient of the NBB’s success was the reliance on the stock of circulating 
bullion as a buffer for central bank reserves. Thanks to the existence of this stock, not all 
outflows of bullion called for central bank intervention. This provided monetary authorities 
with room for flexibility43. 
The third ingredient was the effectiveness of interest rate policy. As the effects of foreign 
exchange intervention are generally short-lived, intervention merely consisted of a technique 
for delaying a modification in access conditions to the central bank’s standing facilities. Once 
interest rate policy was implemented, however, its impact was fully felt by the domestic 
money market thanks to the structural liquidity deficit of the banking system. 
Last but not least, despite the need to meet this deficit, the central bank had ample excess 
resources to be invested in foreign assets: this was made possible by the size of the Bank’s 
liabilities, to which Treasury deposits contributed substantially. The Government had asked 
the Bank to keep domestic interest rates low with the aim of reducing the cost of sovereign 
borrowing, but in order to make this possible it had to contribute to the expansion of the 
NBB’s balance sheets. As deposits were not remunerated, the move must have entailed a non-
negligible loss of interest44. 
                                                          
43
 This opens an interesting perspective: future research might want to investigate if one of the conditions that 
impaired the working of the interwar gold standard with respect to the pre-war one was the disappearance of this 
buffer. 
44
 Available data do not allow to dress a benefits/costs balance for this choice. However, the long-term benefits 
of transforming the Belgian franc into a low-yield currency must have been substantial for government 
borrowing as well. As early as 1874, Belgium was already perceived as the country with the lowest yields on 
sovereign bonds besides Britain (The Economist, 3rd January 1874, p. 6). 
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All in all, the Belgian experience of the 1850s opens scope for a general reassessment of the 
working of 19th-century international monetary systems. Far from being rudimentary and 
automatic, they were actively micro-managed through extremely sophisticated sets of 
monetary policies by shrewd central bankers. No doubts, they still hide many useful lessons 
for the present that only a micro-oriented historical research will be able to reveal. 
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Figure 1: Market interest rates in six financial centres (weekly), 1844-1861. Source: Ugolini (2010), 
except Antwerp (Journal de Commerce d’Anvers). 
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Figures 2.1-4: Weekly foreign exchange operations (in million Belgian francs) vis-à-vis the deviation 
from the arbitrated parity, 1851-1853. White triangles: non-sterilised operations; grey squares: 
sterilised operations. Sources: NBB interventions: author (IC, PV CdA, RAG, 1851-1853); exchange 
rates: Cours authentique de la bourse de Bruxelles; bullion prices: Ugolini (2010). 
 
 
Figure 2.1: Operations on French francs. 
 
 
Figure 2.2: Operations on British pounds. 
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Figure 2.3: Operations on Dutch guilders. 
 
 
Figure 2.4: Operations on Hamburg marks Banco. 
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Figure 3: Composition of NBB foreign reserves (weekly, in million Belgian francs). Source: author. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
26 
 
 
Figure 4: Monthly foreign exchange operations vis-à-vis the cash surplus at the beginning of the 
month (in million Belgian francs), 1851-1853. White triangles: non-sterilised operations; grey squares: 
sterilised operations. Source: author. 
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Figure 5: Exchange rate deviation from the arbitrated par and evidence of silver outflows from 
Belgium to Britain, 1851-1861. Gray line: Gross profitability of exporting silver species to Britain 
(right scale). Black bars: Silver shipments made by the Rothschild agent in Belgium to NM Rothschild 
& Sons in London (in million francs, left scale). White lozenges: Qualitative evidence of silver exports 
by Belgian arbitrageurs in the NBB archives. Black lozenges: Qualitative evidence of silver exports by 
Belgian arbitrageurs in the correspondence of the Rothschild agent in Belgium. Sources: London 
interest rate: Ugolini (2010); Antwerp interest rate, see figure 1; exchange rate: Cours authentique de 
la Bourse de Bruxelles; Rothschild evidence: XI/38/212A-B (Richtenberger, 1851-1853) and 
XI/78/0A-2B (Lambert, 1853-1861); NBB evidence: PV CdA, 1851-1861. 
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Figure 6: NBB interventions on the British pound exchange rate (defined as the percentage of the total 
weekly trading time during which the Bank has been purchasing (+) or selling (-) claims denominated 
in British pounds, left scale) vis-à-vis the Bank’s cash surplus (in million francs, right scale). Sources: 
author (PV CdA, RAG, 1851-1861). 
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Figure 7: The NBB’s reaction to the 1857 crisis. Sources: see figures 1, 5, and 6. 
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Diagram 1.1: Effect on the Bank’s balance 
sheet of sterilised operations. 
 
Diagram 1.2: Effect on the Bank’s balance 
sheet of non-sterilised operations (right). 
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Differential % of Weeks 
-1,50% 0,94% 
-1,00% 2,44% 
-0,50% 25,19% 
Nil 71,43% 
Table 1: Differential between the domestic market rate and the NBB discount rate, 1851-1861. 
Sources: figure 1; PV CdA, 1851-1861. 
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Balance Sheet Components Minimum Maximum Average 
A
SS
ET
S 
1) Bullion Reserve (M) 30,67% 31/01/1853 79,96% 31/01/1851 38,99% 
2) Belgian Treasury Securities 0,34% 31/01/1851 14,56% 29/02/1852 10,24% 
3) Advances on Treasury Securities 1,26% 31/01/1851 9,94% 28/02/1851 6,59% 
4a) Foreign Portfolio (Pf) 3,78% 31/01/1851 31,58% 31/07/1853 22,06% 
4b) Domestic Commercial Portfolio (Pd) 10,42% 28/02/1851 38,59% 31/12/1853 21,48% 
5) Real Estate 0,49% 31/12/1853 0,92% 31/05/1851 0,62% 
6) Other 0,00% 31/12/1853 0,16% 31/07/1851 0,02% 
LI
A
B
IL
IT
IE
S i) Capital and Reserves 11,16% 31/12/1853 44,72% 31/01/1851 16,32% 
ii) Banknotes in Circulation (Bi) 18,66% 31/01/1851 61,59% 31/01/1853 51,25% 
iii) Deposits (D) 23,98% 31/01/1853 46,01% 28/02/1851 32,08% 
iv) Other 0,00% 31/01/1851 1,04% 31/12/1852 0,36% 
TOTAL BALANCE SHEET 33.542.655,02 31/01/1851 137.348.257,66 31/12/1853 103.864.036,68 
Table 2: Minimum, maximum, and average size of NBB balance sheet components, 1851-1853. 
Sources: RAG, 1851-1853, except foreign portfolio (author). 
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(A) 
Average 
Opportunity 
Cost 
(B) 
Average 
Overvaluation 
French Franc 
Top 5* Increases -0,07% 0,00% 
Top 5 Decreases -0,04% 0,00% 
British Pound 
Top 5 Increases 0,00% -0,17% 
Top 5* Decreases -0,04% 0,52% 
Dutch Guilder 
Top 5 Increases 0,05% -0,21% 
Top 5 Decreases 0,05% 0,01% 
Hamburg Mark Banco 
Top 5 Increases -0,10% -0,10% 
Top 5 Decreases -0,06% 0,58% 
Frankfurt Guilder Top 3 Increases 0,21% -0,86% 
Top 3 Decreases -0,01% 0,46% 
Prussian Thaler 
Top 3 Increases -0,06% 0,09% 
Top 3 Decreases 0,19% 0,57% 
Table 3: Major reshufflings in the NBB foreign portfolio composition, vis-à-vis the average 
opportunity cost of the investment and the average overvaluation of the currency in that moment, 
1851-1853. Major reshufflings are defined as the biggest weekly changes in the relative amount of the 
given currency held by the Bank with respect to the total size of foreign reserves. In the light of the 
different scale of operations, ten major reshufflings are identified for the most important currencies, 
and six for the least important ones. A big outlier (a special swap of British pounds for French francs 
implemented during the disturbances of December 1853) is not taken into account, as it falls in the 
category of ‘extraordinary interventions’ (see paragraph 4.3). Column A shows the average difference 
between the average quarterly interest rate yielded by a non-balanced basket of all six currencies and 
the quarterly market interest rate yielded by the given currency during the selected reshufflings. 
Column B shows the average overvaluation of the given currency during the selected reshufflings, 
defined as the exchange rate deviation from the arbitrated par. Sources: author. 
